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SUMMARY
Industrial Control System (ICS) networks used in critical infrastructure networks like
the power grid represent a different set of security challenges when compared to traditional
IT networks. The electric power grid comprises several components most of which are
critical physical devices and have to be safeguarded to ensure reliable operation. The devices
in the field are remotely controlled via the control network of the plant from the control
center. The distributed nature of these networks makes it almost impossible to perform the
same common security practices as done in traditional IT networks (e.g., regular security
upgrades). It is partially due to the fact that these legacy devices are incapable of supporting
future upgrades and because of the remote location of these devices. Cyber attacks on an
electric grid can originate from an external intruder who has gained access to the control
network or from a disgruntled employee who already has access to the network. Among
several possible attacks on an electric grid, this work specifically proposes to tackle the false
data injection issue during control command requests to the field devices in the substation.
The thesis work proposes to help to ensure the authenticity of the responses by analyzing
the observed response against the fingerprints developed by operation times associated with
each device in the plant. Also, in this work, the accuracy of the proposed fingerprinting




The smart grid is an extension of the traditional electrical power grid because of the con-
nection of various subsystems of the grid distributed over different geographical areas by
modern communication components to form a complex Cyber Physical Systems (CPS).
Current research in CPS ranges from exposing the absence of security practices and poli-
cies in operator environments that affects the data integrity of the information in the grid
system; to identifying protocol vulnerabilities inherent in control networks. A new research
direction in the security domain for CPS is to look at the effect of these vulnerabilities on
operational reliability and physical infrastructure. It is important to assess these effects
because in addition to resulting in damage to physical equipment it might result in injury
or loss of life.
Most protocols in control environments were not designed with consideration for
security. Even with the introduction of a security layer as a part of the protocol stack,
the possibility of physical system compromise was not completely eliminated, necessitating
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to analyze the application layer payload. Even though several
techniques have been proposed using DPI to identify malicious commands and false data in
the grid system, their efficiency depends on information collected from all the subsystems
at the time of analysis. In addition to ensuring the efficiency of the Intrusion Detection
System (IDS), the technique proposed should also guarantee the real time requirements of
the grid operation environment. Thus having complex methods of identifying intrusions
might not always be the best solution for security in a smart grid.
The attacks on a grid subsystem are not always from an external malicious intruder
attacking the system, but it might be an insider attack or an operator inadvertently issuing
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a command. Example consequences of such an intrusion can result in blackouts in the power
grid [1] and environmental disasters like waste water sewage, oil and natural gas spillage
[2] which is disastrous for both human life and the environment together. False injection of
command and data are entirely possible in the electric grid. Several cryptographic solutions
are currently available to identify intrusions into the IT networks but the same is not feasible
in Industrial Control System (ICS) networks. Most of the legacy equipment available cannot
be upgraded to the latest firmware to support these solutions due to their remote location
and in some cases they do not even support such an upgrade. For example, previous
research by our group found vulnerabilities in several power system devices and when they
were reported to ICS-CERT, the resulting official advisory for one of the products stated
that “There is no method to update [Schneider Electric SAGE RTUs] devices released prior
to October 2014 ”[3]. Moreover, online upgrades of these equipment are impossible due
to their critical nature of these equipment and temporarily suspending their functionality
will result in unreliable operation of the plant. Due to these concerns, it is imperative that
alternative methods like fingerprinting be used to ensure security and to provide intrusion
detection.
The proposed work discusses a novel passive fingerprinting technique using the
control messages in the ICS networks to generate signatures. This mainly relies on the
fact that even though devices from two different vendors are similarly rated, the variations
in physical characteristics will produce a unique physical response and behavior from each
device. This fingerprinting is unique due to its ability to construct signature from the at-
tributes dependent on physical characteristics of each device which can be further extended
to a new domain of fingerprinting called “white box modeling” approach. An evaluation





This section provides insight into Cyber Physical System (CPS) and its components. It
also provides details of existing fingerprinting approaches and the proposed new modeling
approach for signature generation.
2.1 Physical System in a Power Grid
An electrical grid (or a power grid) is an interconnected network for delivering electricity
from suppliers to customers. It consists of generating stations that produce electric power,
high-voltage transmission lines that carry power from distant sources to demand centers,
and distribution lines that connect individual customers. A general layout of the electrical
grid is shown in Figure 1.
2.2 Cyber System in a Power Grid
Over the years, the electric grid which contained only physical components transformed into
a CPS containing both cyber and physical components. By utilizing modern information
technologies, the electric grid is now capable of delivering efficient power by responding to a
wide range of commands and events. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
is a system that supports remote monitoring and control of various subsystems in a grid
over communication channels through industrial protocols like DNP3, IEC61850, Modbus
etc. SCADA system architecture has evolved over the years from a monolithic architecture
to networked distributed architecture as shown in Figure 2. In the networked distributed
architecture, complex SCADA system components are connected through standardized com-
munication protocols, increasing the reliability and performance of the system. The various
3
Source: [4]
Figure 1: A general electric grid layout
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components of the SCADA systems are:
• PLC - Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) or control master is a microprocessor
based device used in the SCADA system to control the physical elements in the field.
• IED - Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED) are used in the power grid to provide a
level of abstraction between actual physical equipment like circuit breakers in the field
and the control master. The IEDs are digital devices used to monitor and control the
breakers from the control master remotely.
• Historian - A Historian is a software service that accumulates time stamped boolean
alarms, commands and events in a database which can be queried or used to populate
graphic trends in the graphical interface. The historian client is used to access the
historian server for data.
• RTU - Remote Terminal Units exist between control centers and end devices like IEDs
to aid in data accumulation before transmitting the same to the control master.
Source: [5]
Figure 2: SCADA architecture
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SCADA systems are equipped with cyber systems as mentioned above to monitor
and control the field equipment. Usually IEDs are available at the last level in cyber system
which communicates with the field equipment like circuit breaker, transformer, generator,
motors etc. Monitoring and control messages flow between the master devices like PLCs
and IEDs which act like slave devices. So the goal of the proposed technique in this thesis is
to secure these control messages which can be falsified by performing a man in the middle
attack.
Figure 3: Substation network with attack points
Figure 3 illustrates a portion of the substation in the entire SCADA system to
demonstrate the points of attack insertion. This includes Point 1, where the attacker can
provide falsified control messages between the control center and the substation remote
terminal unit (RTU); Point 2, where the attacker can provide falsified control messages
between the RTU and IEDs, and Point 3 where the attacker can provide false data at the
field devices like a circuit breaker etc. In this thesis, the case of falsification of data at
Point 3 is assumed as the attacker’s goal and authentication through device fingerprinting
is provided to identify the intrusion.
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2.3 Circuit Breaker
There are several types of field equipment in an electric grid, however in this work we focus
on the circuit breaker to demonstrate the feasibility of the idea. A circuit breaker is a
special switch which does the making and breaking of a circuit while carrying high current.
The circuit breaker consists of a fixed contact and a moving contact. In the “Closed” con-
dition state, the two contacts are connected and current flows. The breaker arrangement
contains stored potential energy which when released aids in closing the contacts. Usu-
ally this potential energy is stored by deforming a metal spring by compressed air or by
hydraulic pressure. All circuit breakers are equipped with closing coils and whenever this
coil is energized, it dispatches the plunger releasing the potential energy. The plunger con-
verts the stored potential energy into kinetic energy to move the contacts. The operating
characteristic curve of the breaker is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Operation characteristics of circuit breaker
2.3.0.1 Closing Operation
1. At time T0, current starts flowing through the closing coil.
2. Between time T0 to T1, the moving contact of the breaker starts moving towards the
fixed contact.
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3. From time T1-T3, the moving contact has travelled the gap distance and has touched
the fixed contact.
4. The small distortion over the period T3-T4 shows the bounce back distance of the
moving contact after it touches the fixed contact.
5. By the start of T4, the breaker has moved into closed position.
2.3.0.2 Tripping Operation
1. At time T5 current starts flowing through the tripping coil.
2. At time T6 the moving contact starts moving away from fixed contact.
3. By the end of time T8 the moving contact returns to its beginning position.
4. During time T8-T9 the moving contact oscillates due to the inertia of the moving
contact before settling down.
5. At time T9 the moving contact finally reaches the rest position.
In order to generate a signature for each device, the operation time for OPEN/CLOSE
commands of a circuit breaker are considered. Circuit breakers exist in all voltage ratings
from 110V to 220kV but are too dangerous and costly to experiment with in lab. Hence, in
this work we decided to use a latching relay to simulate the operations of a circuit breaker.
2.3.1 Latching Relay Operation
The latching relays are also referred to as “holding circuits”. Figure 5 shows the connection
diagram of a generic latching relay. It contains
• A - Electromagnet
• B - Spring to retract the contact when the magnet is not energized
8
• C & D - Controlled circuit, on when the magnet is energized and off when the magnet
is not energized
• E - Power to energize the electromagnet
• F - Trigger power source
• G - A push to disconnect button, normally is always on unless actually pushed, will
reconnect when you let go of the button
• H - A push to connect switch, only connects the circuit when pressed, when you let
go of the button, the connection is broken
Source: [6]
Figure 5: Latching relay circuit
Pushing the button H will energize the electromagnet and close the load contacts
in the relay, which will then stay latched after the H button is released because the load
contacts have now provided another route to complete the trigger power for the electromag-
net. To unlatch, the G button is pushed which will cut the trigger power and unlatch the
relay. A slight modification of this type of relay is one that has a wiring configuration with
multiple sets of contacts within them where, one set of latching contacts would be used for




SCADA architectures rely on a communication model with multiple protocol layers to
counter noise and signal distortion. Of the several legacy protocols, DNP3 was devel-
oped by Westronic Inc. in early 1990s. DNP3 was designed to optimize the transmission
of data commands and data status between DNP3 devices. It is not a general purpose
protocol like those found on the Internet for transmitting email, hypertext documents, SQL
queries, multimedia or large files. In the SCADA environment, the DNP3 protocol is used
to exchange control and event messages between master and the slave equipment. DNP3
supports unicast transactions between the DNP3 master and outstation devices, where the
master sends a request message to an addressed outstation slave, which responds with a
reply message. DNP3 supports different network configurations and the most common con-
figuration is the “multi-drop” configuration where one master communicates with multiple
outstations as shown in Figure 6.
Source: [7]
Figure 6: DNP3 multi-drop architecture
The DNP3 protocol has a physical layer for transmitting messages over a wired
copper or fiber physical network. The data link layer provides reliable communication
between devices to facilitate transfer of Ethernet frames. The link layer functionality is
similar to link layer in the TCP/IP protocol stack. The pseudo-transport layer in the DNP3
protocol stack helps with fragmentation and reassembly. The application layer contains
request and reply messages which define the role of the device i.e., master or outstation
device. A request message comes from the master to a slave device to perform a write, collect
and provide data or perform time synchronization. The messages from the application layer
can be solicited/polling-based or unsolicited messages.
10
Source: [7]
Figure 7: DNP3 application layer message structure
Figure 7 shows the application layer message format. The control field in the
application header specifies a sequence number which is necessary for reassembly. The
function code indicates whether the message is a request message or a reply message which
uses internal indications to show if it is a confirmation message or a response message. The
payload of the application layer message carries the data objects in form of binary outputs,
analog inputs, analog outputs, binary inputs and counters.
2.4.1 DNP3 Event
DNP3 events are used to indicate important status changes in the field. The DNP3 protocol
specifies the usage of an event buffer, but leaves its implementation to vendors. There are
two types of event buffers that are available in DNP3 slave devices: Sequence Of Event
(SOE) and Most Recent Event (MRE). The former type stores all received data in the
event buffer and every new event is appended to the event buffer. The latter type stores the
most recent event and the newly arrived data overwrite the previous data. Each DNP3 slave
device is programmed to respond in one of the two modes: event Polling and unsolicited
Response. The former mode involves the master periodically polling the slave devices in
a round robin fashion. The latter mode involves the slave automatically responding to
the master with its event changes during a critical event change. The DNP3 frame in the
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application layer contains information about type of event, value of event, event index, time
stamp of the event, event variation and event class. Among all the binary event types in
this thesis we specifically concentrate on binary input with time stamps. The change of
binary input with time stamps is used to represent the changed state of the digital input
as observed at the field device. It also indicates the status point as follows:
• The on-line bit indicates that the binary input point has been read successfully. If
this field is set to off-line, the state of the digital point may be incorrect.
• The restart bit indicates that the field device that originated the data object is cur-
rently restarting. This device may be the device reporting this data object.
• The communication lost bit indicates that the device reporting this data object has
lost communication with the originator of the data object.
• The remote forced data bit indicates that the state of the binary input has been forced
to its current state at the device other than the end device.
• The local forced data bit indicates that the state of the binary input has been forced
to its current state at the end device.
• The chatter filter bit indicates that the binary input point has been filtered in order
to remove needless transitions in the state of the point.
• The state bit indicates the current state of the binary input point.
• The time of occurrence indicates the absolute time at which the end device detected
the change of state. The accuracy of this time will depend on the accuracy of the
individual device. Time of occurrence is recorded as milliseconds since midnight,
January 1st, 1970, at zero hours, zero minutes, seconds and milliseconds. The format
of a DNP3 event message encoding is shown below in Figure 8.
12
Source: [7]
Figure 8: DNP3 event message encoding
2.4.2 DNP3 Control Command
DNP3 control commands provides binary output points that are used to provide level high
or pulse signals to control output devices such as breaker. The DNP3 master issues control
commands to the DNP3 slave in order to operate the breaker. The binary output commands
are classified as:
• Single point output with 0 de-energizing latch coil (open) and 1 energizing latch coil
(close).
• Double binary output with 01 energizing reset coil (open) and 10 energizing latch coil
(close).
Figure 9 shows the data object of the packet transmitted by the DNP3 Master. The Control
Code indicates trip/close signal in bits 6 and 7. Bit 1 indicates sending a pulse signal and
bit 5 indicates clearing the latched signal in case of a level signal. Count indicates the
number of pulses to be sent to the breaker. For each pulse, on time period and off time
period are also chosen according to the rating of the breaker involved.
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Source: [8]
Figure 9: Transmit data object
The DNP3 slave device is an IED which in turn sends a signal to operate the
breaker. This signal is a hardwired signal and the time it consumes is in order of nanosec-
onds. There are two types of binary control commands namely: direct operate and select
Figure 10: Two step select before operate
before operate.
• Direct Operate - In this type of command, the master sends a command to the slave
device to operate the breaker without a prior selection of the breaker for operation.
• Select Before Operate - In this type of command, the master sends a command to the
slave device to operate the breaker in a two step process as shown in Figure 10.
In this work, we demonstrate the proposed idea through the direct operate command for
both open and close. The completion of the field device’s operation is indicated in the
form of a hardwired signal to the DNP3 slave. The slave then responds back to the master
via an unsolicited response or polling based response depending on the configuration. It
is redundant to observe both the responses because as soon as the DNP3 slave sends the
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unsolicited response for a binary event change, a polling request to identify the binary event
change will not receive a response packet as the event change has already been recorded.
So in this work, unsolicited response is chosen to observe the event changes.
2.5 Fingerprinting
Device fingerprinting usually requires the collection of information from a remote computing
device for the purpose of unique identification of the device. This is a well researched topic
with several solutions already proposed. There are two types of fingerprinting techniques:
passive and active. Active fingerprinting assumes that the fingerprinted device will tolerate
some amount of invasive probing through crafted packets. Even though this solution has
been in use for a very long time it is not suitable for the ICS environment. This is because
ICS devices perform critical functions and active probing could potentially crash the de-
vice. So, it is preferred to use passive fingerprinting which is implemented by observing the
packet communications between devices. This is usually done based on factors such as OS
implementations of TCP/IP protocol stack, IEEE 802.11 (wireless) device driver implemen-
tation and hardware clock skew. This thesis proposes to extend the passive fingerprinting
technique to ICS environment to fingerprint the field equipment in the grid systems.
The signature of a device is obtained by collecting the response times of the circuit
breaker and representing these operation times as a probability density function (PDF).
The signature of the devices can be obtained in one of the three methods: white box, black
box and gray box modeling. In a black box approach, the PDF is constructed strictly from
empirical data without any prior model and hence requires a large amount of measurements
to construct the signature. This modeling approach is the common method used by all
previous fingerprinting work. In a white box model, the PDF is constructed by building the
device model through data sheets and CAD drawings of the device. This model is simulated
and parameters are varied to create a PDF using uncertainty distributions. In a gray box
approach, it takes the characteristics of both black and white box modeling to create a PDF.
In this case uncertainty in white box modeling is improved by the experimental observations
15
from black box modeling. This thesis proposes the usage of black box modelling to develop
a signature for latching relays between two vendors but the underlying idea to develop





Cyber Security in control systems became an important topic of research when a piece of
malware called “Stuxnet” took advantage of “day Zero” vulnerabilities in Windows and
targeted Industrial Control Systems (ICS) in uranium centrifuges in Iran. Related works
such as [10] and [11] expose the attack model of Stuxnet and the extent of damage it
caused in control systems, emphasizing the need for cyber security in SCADA and control
systems. Later, works like [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], and [18] provided a comprehensive
overview of the various vulnerabilities and potential threats to SCADA systems. They
call attention to the differences in the network architecture of SCADA systems from the
standard IT systems and highlighted the set of security goals that need to be achieved
to prevent physical damages to the subsystems. Wang et al. in [19] and Cardenas et al.
[20], in addition to shedding light on security requirements and network vulnerabilities, also
provide attack countermeasures to ensure smart grid security. They provide attack models
targeting basic security objectives such as availability, integrity and confidentiality.
Even though the NERC standard provides security requirements for SCADA sys-
tems similar to standard IT systems, traditionally used signature-based intrusion detection
is not a very viable option for cyber security in grid environments as there are not many
registered signatures of attacks for smart grids. Instead, anomaly and specification-based
intrusion detection systems seem more feasible solution for smart grids since the electrical
systems have static predictable topology, a regular traffic pattern and a fixed set of legacy
protocols.
Verba in [21] implemented a flow based intrusion detection technique using deep
packet inspection and network traffic pattern matching to identify packet tampering. In
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this technique, man in the middle attacks caused by compromising an Application Server
(AS) and Front End Processor (FEP) is detected by analyzing the network flow traffic pat-
tern. Cheung et al. in [22] proposed a model based IDS for the Modbus TCP protocol. In
their paper, the expected communication pattern was used to create protocol level models
for characterizing requests and responses based on Modbus guidelines. Any deviation from
this model was predicted to be an anomaly. Two main disadvantages prevented the model
based approach to be widespread: the first one being its complexity in constructing models
for proprietary implementations of protocols and the second one being the larger number of
false alarms. To confront these challenges, the specification based intrusion detection tech-
nique was introduced which is similar to anomaly based techniques except it uses a manually
specified model. The challenge in identifying features for making the perfect specification
model was overcome by the introduction of data mining to extract features from the large
volume of previously collected traffic. Sekar et al. in [23] proposed a specification based
IDS by using state machine specifications of network protocols and information statistics to
detect anomalies. The difference between previously proposed IDS techniques and the one
proposed in [23] is to not rely on expert identification of network protocol features but to
rather rely on protocol state machine specifications to detect intrusions. A prototype spec-
ification based intrusion detection system framework based on Bro to verify that semantics
of data extracted from network packets conform to protocol definitions was proposed in
[24].
A Neural Network based IDS proposed in [25] specifies a window based feature
vector capture to accurately depict the trends and pattern of the packet stream. A specific
combination of neural network learning algorithms helps in identifying the deviation from
normal behavior. The work uses packet characteristics to detect abnormal network traffic
in SCADA systems. More related data mining works in cybersecurity [26] demonstrate the
usage of data mining techniques to detect SYN flood attacks and buffer overflow attacks
in SCADA systems. In their paper, data set is collected based on attributes of the attack
and several data mining methods were run based on Waikato Environment for Knowledge
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Analysis (WEKA) to detect intrusions.
Two very common control protocols are Modbus and DNP3. DNP3 is open source
and more often used in power related environments. The DNP3 group released an applica-
tion note on validation of incoming DNP3 data through numerous checks of components as
specified in the IEEE Std. in [27].
Samuel East et al. in [28] detailed the attacks possible in different layers of the
DNP3 protocol stack including the application layer. These attacks target specific vulner-
abilities in the DNP3 protocol stack and demonstrates how these vulnerabilities can be
exploited. Dongsoo et al. in [29] have successfully created a cyber security testbed for
DNP3 man in the middle attacks and Jin et al. in [30] successfully demonstrated attacks
on the DNP3 event buffer with unsolicited messages.
Understanding the security concerns in a smart grid requires a deeper inspection
of cyber-physical interactions to quantify attack impacts on physical systems and checking
if the counter measures proposed are effective or not. Even though specification based IDS
technologies proved to be a more viable option towards protecting the SCADA systems,
it is not adequate to ensure reliable operation in a distributed coordinated attack. Power
System physics like Ohm’s and Kirchhoff’s laws along with state estimation that are used to
operate and monitor the power grid have been used to provide security by filtering the bad
measurement values in energy management systems [31], [32]. A recent work [33] on the
same thought process highlighted vulnerabilities of bad detection of state estimation in well
constructed byzantine data injection attacks that provide physically valid measurements.
Cardenas et al. [34] studied vulnerabilities in SCADA controllers to network attacks in
process control systems. In their paper, they show how by incorporating knowledge of the
physical system under control, network attacks changing the behavior of control systems
can be detected. Their work was one of the first novel IDSs considering physical operation
within the perimeter of the plant for potentially damaging commands rather than only cy-
ber attacks. Lin et al. in [35] proposed to combine both cyber and physical infrastructure
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in the power grid to help to estimate consequences of control commands, thus to reveal
an attacker’s malicious intentions. Parvania M. in [36] specifies the usage of states of the
control environment and the physical operation states as a baseline reference and detects
the abnormality in operation to reflect an attack. It relies on monitoring specific physical
operations in the electrical grid system and using an ordered sequential pattern of informa-
tion exchange to identify abnormal patterns. Robert M. et al. in [37] proposed specification
based behavior rules for intrusion detection systems derived from control loops which tie
intrusion detection to critical rules in the physical system. Maarten Hoeve in [38] proposed
detecting intrusions in encrypted control traffic. The approach searches for a series of pack-
ets based on edit distance from appropriate string matching, to recognize known insertions
and alert on unknown insertions.
One of the well known fingerprinting tools is “NMap”[39] which employs an active
fingerprinting technique to identify OS and server versions running on a machine based on
how the end device responds. An example of an open source passive fingerprinting tool
is “p0f” which examines TCP and HTTP header fields to determine information about a
remote computing device such as OS and browser version [40]. The first attempt at formal-
izing methods for active and passive fingerprinting of network protocols was published in
2006, where authors used parameterized extended finite state machine (PEFSMs) to model
the behavior of different protocol implementations [41]. Kohno et al. in [42] used TCP
timestamps to detect individual clock skew to perform device fingerprinting. Devices in the
ICS environment are static in nature and does not change over the period of time, thus
making it feasible to perform device fingerprinting. This helps in identifying any device in
the network that does not belong to the ICS network. Gao et al. in [43] performed device
fingerprinting using wavelet analysis on passively observed traffic to fingerprint and identify
the access point in the network. The wavelet analysis was designed and tested only on
wireless access points under heavy loads, a scenario that does not occur in ICS where wired
communication is preferred for its reliability. So the same technique might not be practical
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for ICS. Francois et al. in [44] used models of timing of a device’s implementation of appli-
cation layer protocols using Temporal Random Parameterized Tree Extended Finite State
Machines (TR-FSMs). While using the finite state machines a large database of all sessions
are needed and all possible states should be mapped. This is not fully feasible because the
ICS environment is interactive in nature thus increasing the non-determinism and hence
number of states in the finite state machine. In another work Ureten et al. in [45] proposed
device fingerprinting by observing the inter arrival packet time (IAT) to identify devices
and device types. This seems feasible, but to achieve reasonable accuracy it needs large
number of observations. This is not always possible in ICS environments due to the large
polling period and hence a different fingerprinting method with fewer samples is a better
choice. Another unique approach to passive device fingerprinting relevant to the proposed
work concerns the network physical layer communication. Ureten in [46] used amplitude
and phase measurements of the signals generated by Wi-Fi radios to identify individual
devices. This may have been the first work to use physical measurements to fingerprint
devices, but it still is not feasible in ICS networks where Wi-Fi devices are rarely used.
The fingerprinting method proposed in this thesis provides higher accuracy than previously
proposed techniques and is more suited for ICS networks. It is different from the previous
techniques in the notion that it extends the idea of physical layer fingerprinting to identi-
fying ICS field and control devices based on reported timings of their physical operations.
The goal of the proposed technique is not to be exclusively used in the ICS environment
but rather provide a “defense in breadth” by augmenting existing IDS techniques which
have been already researched for ICS networks. Its independent nature in terms of protocol





Cyber security has been identified as a critical issue for successful and reliable operation
of the power grid. The power grid consists of several critical physical devices which have
to be safeguarded. Most of these devices are remotely controlled thus giving rise to many
potential vulnerabilities. Cyber attacks on a substation can originate from a malicious
intruder outside the substation, an insider who already has access to the substation network
or from an operator who inadvertently issues a command. This thesis work discusses the
proposed technique to protect electric grid from failure during malicious control message
injection but this could be easily extended to several ICS networks.
4.1 Threat Model and Assumptions
One unique feature of ICS network is its distributed nature thus providing a vast attack
surface that needs to be secured. For example, the electric utility which provided experi-
mental data to analyze and characterize ICS network for research purposes covers an area
of 2800 square miles with 35 substations, where each point of entry to the network is an
attack point. This vast surface makes it almost impossible to protect and thus an attacker
attacking the surface can be a disgruntled insider with legitimate access or an outsider who
has gained access into the target network as shown in Figure 11.
The attack model for the proposed idea is demonstrated using DNP3 based circuit
breaker operation in Figure 12. During normal operation the following sequence of operation
is observed.
• The DNP3 master device sends a CLOSE/OPEN command to the DNP3 slave device.
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Figure 11: Attack graph to conduct an attack in ICS network
Figure 12: Timing diagram for attack Model with Breaker Operation
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• The slave device in turn sends the hardwired command to the circuit breaker.
• Physical device responds back with the status of the circuit breaker to the DNP3 slave
device.
• The DNP3 slave device sends the status information to the DNP3 master.
In the attack scenario assumed in this thesis work, even before the response from
DNP3 slave reaches the DNP3 master either due to delay in network or man in the middle
attack by the intruder, the intruder hijacks the TCP connection to send a spoofed response
to the DNP3 master. Due to lack of any authentication mechanism as of today the master
does not have a way to verify the authenticity of the response. With this in mind, the goal
of this research is to develop accurate fingerprinting methods to identify from what type of
device the response is originating from, a legitimate IED, or an adversary with a laptop
who has gained access into the network.
Source:[47]
Figure 13: The one line diagram of a substation
A hypothesized scenario is described for better understanding of the importance
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of this form of network intrusion and the effect of the intrusion on the rest of the system.
Figure 13 shows the single line diagram of a substation. A substation like the one shown
above is usually equipped with a recloser unit to ensure continuous availability of power
to the downstream feeders. During normal operation in the substation two out of three
breakers (breaker-1, breaker-2 and tie-breaker) are closed to ensure continuous availability
of power to the downstream feeders. On indication of an unhealthy supply on one of the
incoming feeders the recloser unit will interfere, closing the tie-breaker and opening the
unhealthy supply line. Thus during normal operation of the substation, 2-out-of-3 breaker
configuration is maintained. Suppose in such a scenario, assume a CLOSE command has
been sent by the master to recloser unit to close the tie-breaker and an attacker performs a
denial of service (DOS) attack on recloser unit. The attacker then sends a “closed status”
back to master but the CLOSE command was never sent to the tie-breaker due to a DOS
attack. The master assumes that the received response was a legitimate response and
issues the next OPEN command thus disrupting the power availability to one side of the
substation. This is one such scenario which substantiates the need for authenticating the
field responses.
To formally state the problem, assume global set of all ICS devices G consists
of products Dj,k where j identifies the vendor and k signifies the model for each vendor’s
product. Given a sequence of observations Oi every device i on the network, the goal of the
fingerprinting methods will be to identify which subset of G, specifically which Dj,k those
observations belong to.
4.1.1 Proposed Solution
The main characteristic that differentiate ICS networks from more traditional IT networks
is its primary functions of data acquisition through regular polling for measurements and
control. This characteristic holds true not only for electric grid but also for several infras-
tructure networks operating distribution of water, oil and natural gas. As mentioned in
Chapter 3 due to unavailability of large number of control samples to create fingerprint,
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the proposed idea is demonstrated only with lab experiments. Additionally a new method
to create a model of the device without observing the network capture is also developed to
introduce a new domain of fingerprinting methods.
The proposed fingerprinting method leverages the unique properties of physical
devices between vendors in the ICS environment which produces different operation times
and then develops a fingerprint for each device based on the distribution of these times.
The timing diagram of how this measurement is collected is illustrated in Figure 14 and
this time is called as “Breaker Operation Time” (BOT).
Figure 14: Measurement of device response time
The fingerprint signature is defined by a vector of bin counts from a histogram of
BOTs where the final bin includes all values greater than a heuristic threshold. For a formal
definition, let M be a set of operation time measurements from a specific device, B define
the number of bins in the histogram ( and equivalently the number of features in signature
vector), and H denote the heuristic threshold chosen to be an estimate of the maximum
value an operation should ever take. All the obtained observations by thresholds ti where
ti = i
H
B−1 , and define each element sj of the signature vector by the following equation:
sj =

|{m : tj−1 ≤ m < tj ,m ∈M}| 0 < j < B




The whole approach of using BOT for fingerprinting is feasible because they rely on physical
properties of device which remains the same for a long period of time. They tend to change
eventually, for instance, pressure of vacuum in a vacuum circuit breaker reduces around
20,000 operations. Hence these properties stay constant for a long period of time thus
defining the operation time by physical and mechanical properties of the device. The
proposed work uses this immutable property to create the fingerprint. To understand why
this is true for ICS devices, an explanation based on physics behind the operation of the
device is explained below.
To demonstrate the implication of mechanical and physical properties on operation
time, two latching relays with a solenoid arrangement has been chosen as shown in Figure 15.
The electromagnetic force produced while energizing the solenoid coil is directly proportional
to current though the solenoid, number of turns in the solenoid, cross sectional area of the
solenoid core and the type of the core.
Figure 15: Latching relay constituents
F = (N ∗ I)2u0A/(2g2) (2)
N - Number of turns in the solenoid
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I - the current, in amperes(A),running through the solenoid
A - the cross-sectional area, in meters-squared, of the solenoidal magnet
g - the distance in meters, between the magnet and piece of metal
k - 4 x pi x 10-7 (a constant)
This electromagnetic force governs the operation time, and modification of any one
of these variables due to different vendor implementations results in unique signatures. The
electromagnetic force is directly proportional to the operation time because this is the force
that is responsible for moving the contact from one position to another. The modification
of any one of these components result in a unique signature in the form of varying ranges
of operation time for different vendors. This work proposes to use this signature from the
network traffic to fingerprint the physical devices in the field.
In addition to proposing a specific distribution in order to differentiate the de-
vices per vendor, individual physical operations like OPEN or CLOSE will also produce
a difference in operation times. This is again attributed to the different force involved in
maintaining the position of the contact from the previous operation. This work discusses
the difference in operation times between open and close produced by spring force and
magnetic force respectively. Thus a combined pattern of OPEN and CLOSE operations
produces an additional fingerprint to distinguish between vendors.
Table 1: Operation Time Dependence Parameters





Impact of Idle time
Times of Operation
Electrical Characteristics Rate of Decay of Dielectric Strength
The breaker operation time is observed from the network traffic visible at the tap
point. This is because when the breaker responds to the operate command from the master,
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an event change is observed at the DNP3 slave device. With unsolicited response enabled
in the DNP3 slave device, the DNP3 slave asynchronously responds back with a message
on an event change. Since the DNP3 protocol supports Sequence of Event Recorder (SER)
timestamps as explained in Chapter 2, it is possible to accurately pinpoint the time at
which each event occurred. Therefore, operation times can be estimated based on two
different methods:
1. Unsolicited Response Timestamps - Calculated by the OS at the tap point by taking
the difference between the time at which the command was observed and the time at
which the response was observed. m = t3 − t1
2. SER Response Timestamps - Calculated from the difference between the time at
which the command was observed at the tap point and the application layer event
timestamp. m = t2 − t1
Even though operation times are dependent on electromagnetic force which is
governed by Equation 2, IEC62271-302 provides its dependence on dynamic instantaneous
characteristics in addition to the physical structure’s arrangement. Table 1 shows the
physical parameters depending upon which the circuit breaker operation time changes.
Thus effect of other features provides an additional indeterminism in the operation times




5.1 Experimental Test Setup
To demonstrate the proposed approach, latching relay operation was chosen. The experi-
mental setup consists of C++ software based DNP3 master from a C++ open source DNP3
implementation (OpenDNP3 version 2.0), an SEL-751A DNP3 slave and two latching relays
to demonstrate fingerprinting based on operation time. At the tap point in Figure 16, a
C based DNP3 sniffer is used to sniff and parse the DNP3 packets to perform deep packet
inspection. At the same tap point, the packets are timestamped by the Linux operating
system which is time synchronized by the same time source as that of the DNP3 master
and DNP3 slave by SNTP protocol.
Figure 16: Experimental test setup-fingerprinting breakers
The SEL-751A is a feeder protection relay supporting Modbus, DNP3, IEC61850
protocol, time synchronization based on SNTP protocol and a fast SER protocol which
timestamps events with millisecond resolution. The SER buffer settings in the device were
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enabled to send the response with a delay of 0ms, thus sending the response as soon as the
event was observed. The experimental setup for both relays consisted of a latching circuit
(Figure 17) and a load circuit (Figure 18). An image of experimental test setup with two
latching relays and SEL 751A relay is shown in Figure 19.
Figure 17: Operation circuit for latching relay
Figure 18: Load circuit for latching relay
Figure 19: An image of the connection test setup
The latching circuit works on an operating voltage of 24VDC needing about 1A
to operate and load circuit is based on 110V since the binary input on the IED is rated for
that. On a CLOSE command from the DNP3 master, the IED activates a binary output
energizing the latch coil to close the load circuit. Once the load circuit is energized, the
feedback is sent back to activate a binary input in the IED. This event is timestamped and
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provided back to the relay as activated input. On an OPEN command from the DNP3
master, the IED activates the second binary output energizing the reset coil thus opening
the load circuit. This deactivates the binary input and is recorded as an event change. For
these experiments, 2500 DNP3 OPEN and CLOSE commands were issued simultaneously
to both the latching relays with an idle time of 20ms between operations. The command
and responses were recorded at the tap point and operation times were calculated using
both the unsolicited response method and SER based method.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Fingerprinting using Unsolicited Response
Figure 20: Distribution of open operation times based on unsolicited responses
Figure 21: Distribution of Close operation times based on unsolicited responses
The operation time based on unsolicited responses was estimated by measuring
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the time difference between when the request was sent and when the unsolicited response
indicating the event was received. Figure 20 and Figure 21 shows the distribution of open
and close operation times respectively based on unsolicited responses. These results are
based on unsolicited response observed at the tap point without looking into the applica-
tion layer of the packet. It is observed that this distribution does not help to fingerprint
the device from different vendors. This is because the operation time of the physical device
is lesser than the time taken by the DNP3 slave to sense the event, generate the response,
and send the packet, thus obscuring the actual operation time of the physical device. Af-
ter comparing the unsolicited packet capture and the polling based packet capture it was
observed that the event buffer was not filled up even after the device had received the
latching relay opened/closed feedback. Thus it dominates the actual operation time of the
physical device. The components of the unsolicited timestamp are response creation time,
transmission time and propagation time. The propagation time is considered to be constant
as the experimental setup involves no network delay. The remaining difference in time is
produced by time taken by the DNP3 slave to unpack the packet and send the command
to the physical device, time taken for the physical device to operate and time taken by the
DNP3 slave to create the response packet to be sent back to the master. The time taken
to send the response packet overshadows the operation time thus making it unusable for
fingerprinting the device. This necessitates the need for deep packet inspection and to refer
to the application layer timestamp to accurately determine the operation time.
5.2.2 Fingerprinting based on SER timestamps to differentiate vendors
The distributions of close operation times based on SER timestamps for devices from two
different vendors are illustrated in Figure 22. The times range from 26ms to 38ms for the 1st
vendor and 14ms to 33ms for the 2nd vendor. Even though both of these devices have similar
ratings, the difference in operation is attributed to difference in physical makeup between
them. Both of them are made of solenoid coil based magnetic arrangement with one pulse to
move their contacts in one direction and another redirected pulse to move them back. The
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Figure 22: Distribution of close operation times based on SER responses
magnetic force from the solenoid coil arrangement is given by the equation 2. The reason for
the 1st vendor’s slow operation time is due to the smaller cross-sectional area of the solenoid
core in the device. The magnetic force is responsible for moving the contact and reduced
cross-sectional area results in reduced magnetic force since it is directly proportional to force.
Thus reduced force resulted in increased operation time. This variation in operation time
provides a unique fingerprint based on physical arrangement of the device. The physical
characteristics of the field device and its effect on the mechanical operation of the device
are directly related thus making the responses dependent on the mechanical characteristics
which are difficult to forge.
The machine learning algorithm used in these experiments to classify the labeled
data was a feed forward artificial neural network (FF ANN) with one hidden layer trained
using the back propagation algorithm. The bin counts of the histograms, as defined in
Equation 1, were used as the feature vector for each sample and the time slice they were
taken over was varied. The samples were randomly divided using 75% as training data and
25% as testing data. This technique when applied were able to classify the latches based on
SER timestamped operations, the accuracy leveled off around 88%. The average accuracy,
precision, and recall for these experiments are shown in Figure 24, and suggests that even
with time slices as small as 30 minutes, very high accuracy, precision, and recall can be
34
Figure 23: Distribution of open operation times based on SER responses
achieved.
Figure 24: Classification performance based on timestamped close operations
Figure 23 shows the distribution of open operation times for devices from two
different vendors. The time range varies from 22ms to 35ms for both the devices and shows
that there is no variation between them. The interruption or opening time of the relay is
provided in the data sheet of the relay and it is taken as the point of reference for choosing
the relay. Thus the observation that two devices has the same opening time is validated.
This is counter-productive for fingerprinting and thus the close operation must be used to
fingerprint the devices among vendors.
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5.2.3 Fingerprinting based on SER timestamps to differentiate between Op-
erations
Figure 25: Distribution of open and close operation times based on SER responses for
vendor-2
Figure 25 shows the distribution of open and close operations from 1st vendor. The
reason for difference in operation times in the same device is attributed to the permanent
magnet arrangement to hold the position of the contacts. The magnet is ’H’ shaped, one
end of which is connected to the plate attached to the moving contact. This arrangement
magnetizes the plate and helps in providing the torque to move the moving contact. The
torque to move the contacts is higher in one direction than in the other direction due to
the distance involved in the movement represented by the equation 3.
Torque = r ∗ F (3)
r - perpendicular distance from pivot to point where force is applied
F - applied force
For the same amount of magnetic force, the torque is directly proportional to the
distance relative to the pivot. Thus for one position, the distance is less thus having less
torque and for the second position the torque is higher due to longer distance. This clearly
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produces distinct operation time ranges for the vendor device.
Figure 26: Distribution of open and close operation times based on SER responses for
vendor-1
On repeating the experiments on the second vendor device, the distribution of
open and close operation times (Figure 26) were very different from the 1st vendor. This
was attributed to the force used to hold the last operated position until a second pulse resets
the relay back to its original state. The device from this vendor uses spring arrangement
for holding the position in one direction and magnetic force (equation 2) from a permanent
magnet in the other direction. The force of the spring arrangement is represented by the
equation 4.
F = −k ∗X (4)
k - spring constant
X - amount by which the free end of the spring was displaced from its relaxed position
This difference in arrangement provides a unique fingerprint when open and close
operation pattern are considered together to differentiate devices between vendors.
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5.3 Difference between single device and n-device operation
The purpose of this set of experiments was to determine if a there were any significant
differences between one physical device operating behind an IED or n such devices. To
test this, two devices were simultaneously operated and the operation times were compared
with experiments where only one device was operated in Figure 27.
Figure 27: Distribution of open and close operation times based on SER responses for
vendor-1
While the two experiments look too similar to draw any firm conclusions, there are
some small differences that suggest a possible trend and could be investigated further. The
distribution of operation times with only one device appears to have more “fast” operation
times less than 20ms. This could be caused by the time stamping of the DNP3 slave device
varying since it has to perform more work when it has to monitor two devices than when it
has to monitor single device.
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5.4 Does protocol matter?
During the initial phase of this research work, it was assumed that the protocol through
which the breaker operation used was irrelevant, as the main objective was to identify the
breaker operation time. But experiments proved that the packet timing with DNP3 unso-
licited response will not serve much in providing unique signatures. Additionally, frequent
polling for measurements every 1ms using Modbus also did not yield distinguishable results
as shown in Figure 29 and Figure 28. Therefore, in order for fingerprinting technique
to work, the protocol being used should support event based time stamping with at least
millisecond resolution, which is needed to accurately determine the signature of a particular
physical device. This work used DNP3 as an example protocol but other protocols such as
Synchrophasor and IEC61850 would also suffice.
Figure 28: Distribution of close operation times based on Modbus protocol
Moreover IEC61850 GOOSE protocol, which by standard is faster than DNP3
could be a more ideal choice. One more observation regarding protocol from this work is
that while using DNP3, no information about the physical device was found to be directly
obtainable from the network traffic itself. Therefore, it is necessary to perform a deep
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Figure 29: Distribution of open operation times based on Modbus protocol
packet inspection to get a unique signature since the timestamps are available only at
the application layer. This suggests that implementing security at the Transport layer to
encrypt the application layer payload should prevent information leakage from the physical
device connected to the DNP3 slave.
5.5 Discussion
5.5.1 Performance
In order for a fingerprinting method to be useful for any situation, whether it is for intrusion
detection, surveillance, or network management, the techniques should be relatively accurate
and scalable.
Accuracy: While this method was able to obtain the acceptable classification
accuracy needed for an effective stand-alone intrusion detection system, it achieved high
enough accuracy to prove useful in a defense-in-breadth strategy as a supplement to tradi-
tional IDS approaches. The physical fingerprinting method was able to accurately classify
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measurements from two nearly identical devices around 88% of the time. For reference, all
of the previous passive fingerprinting methods described in Chapter 3 achieved classification
accuracies ranging from 86% to 100%, so these performances are quite comparable.
Scalability: The FF-ANN algorithms used in training the fingerprinting tech-
nique only had one hidden layer and 200 input features, resulting in reasonable scalability
for computational complexity. Furthermore, our results suggest that the accuracy for the
methods scales as well. Although the physical fingerprinting method only achieved an ac-
curacy of 88% for two similarly rated devices, it would be expected to achieve even higher
accuracy as more diverse types of devices are added to the test set, resulting in more clear
differences in distributions.
5.5.2 Robustness Against Forgery
When using device fingerprinting to augment traditional IDS methods, it is also desired
that the fingerprints be difficult to forge. To evaluate the proposed method against forgery,
it is assumed that an adversary has gained access to an ICS network, has monitored it to
generate a black box signature for a target device, and is masquerading as that device while
attempting to recreate the signature. The physical fingerprinting method was attacked by
modifying an open source implementation of DNP3 (OpenDNP3 version 2.0) and running
it on the same machine described above. A DNP3 master was configured to send operate
commands every second, and the adversary machine programmed to send responses with
timestamps calculated from the machine’s current time, added with the known distribution
of operation times. The resulting forgery attempt, illustrated in Figure 30, is similar to the
original, but has noticeable differences that could be explained by randomness added by the
adversary’s machine and a faster processor than the original IED. Using the same FF-ANN
methods as above to distinguish between these two resulted in an accuracy of 71.4%, an
average precision of 0.587, and recall of 0.578.
Even though the fingerprinting techniques exhibit resistance to these näıve forgery
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attacks, we admit it is still possible that an attacker could more intelligently shape his re-
sponse times to more closely match the true fingerprint. However, this would require a
significantly more knowledgeable and skilled adversary to successfully accomplish, suggest-
ing that these methods are robust enough to be used as part of a defense-in-breadth IDS
strategy.
Figure 30: Forgery attempt for physical fingerprinting
5.5.3 Limitations
The physical fingerprinting method requires high resolution timing of when operations take
place, so it must be used with protocols that include operation timestamps in their re-
sponses. Not all SCADA protocol support this functionality, but the ones used in time-
critical environments, such as the power grid, do include such timestamps. Requiring times-
tamps in the network traffic is a limitation in the sense that it can make it easier for an
adversary to generate and forge the device fingerprints, but it can also be a defensive
strength in another. If the network traffic is encrypted, an adversary would have to resort
to white box modeling to attempt to generate any fingerprints, which is non-trivial and
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CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, a novel method to passively fingerprint the physical field device in a power
grid environment has been introduced and a proof of concept for such an implementation
has also been provided. All the experiments demonstrated in this work is done with respect
to the electric grid only but can be easily extended to more ICS networks in general. After
evaluating the method with controlled lab experiments, fingerprint classification accuracies
as high as 88% was achieved. The technique showed resistance to simple forgery attacks
and could be practically implemented alongside traditional IDS system solutions to augment
security of critical networks. Even though there are several legacy protocols in ICS network,
the experiments conducted proved that the fingerprinting technique needs high resolution
timestamps in the response which is supported by several ICS networks.
For the future work, we plan to extend this technique towards the fast growing
“Internet Of Things” (IoT) domain. IoT has been pervasive recently and predominantly
used in “Home Automation” (HA) systems where security of the control and response
messages are very important to ensure user’s safety. An example scenario is one where the
user sends the command to lock the apartment but was interrupted by the adversary to
fake the response to the user. Such an attack is capable of causing both the loss of life
and property. A simple solution to tackle this problem is to develop a way to fingerprint
and authenticate the response received from the device. So this technique can be extended
to fingerprint the devices in the IoT system to identify the type of device from which the
response was received. But IoT networks are more complex than ICS network due to their
inherent encryption algorithms similar to traditional IT networks. There is communication
between the mobile application and IoT server first and then the command is sent from
the IoT server to the local IoT controller (e.g., Wink Hub). Usually the communication
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between server and the local IoT controller uses the Zigbee protocol and the physical device
fingerprinting technique can be extended to the IoT space.
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